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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
SMITHA ANDERSON,

)(

)(
On behalf of herself
and all other members of
her class similarly situated,

)(
)(
)(

CIVIL ACTION
FILE NO. 2008CV154757

)(
Plaintiffs,

)(

)(
v.

CLASS ACTION

)(

)(
PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
)(
RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, et al. )(

)(
Defendants.

)(

------------------------------~)(

FILED IN OFFICE
..

JUl - 8 ,2009
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT
FULTON COUNTY GA

ORDER ON ATTORNEYS' FEES
Counsel for the parties appeared at a hearing held on July 8, 2009 to present oral
argument and evidence regarding the application of counsel for Plaintiffs ("Class Counsel") for
an award of attorneys' fees. The Court, having considered the record of the case and the
arguments and evidence presented, and the brief submitted on the issues, finds as follows:
Class Counsel for Plaintiffs (individually, "Class Members," or, collectively, the "Class")
seek an award of attorneys' fees and expenses as a percentage ofthe common fund in this action
(the "Fee and Expense Award).l As agreed upon by the parties in their Settlement Agreement,
25% of certain amounts paid by PSERS has been set aside previously as the Fee and Expense
Fund, subject to this Court's determination of the amount to be awarded Class Counsel. As
further provided in the Settlement Agreement, amounts previously set aside as the Fee and
Expense Fund will become the Fee and Expense Award, and certain future amounts will
Section II(A)(16) of the Settlement Agreement filed with the Court on May 1,
2009 defmes the elements that make up the common fund.
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thereafter be added to the Fee and Expense Award, consistent with this Court's determination of
the percentage of the common fund to be awarded. After payment of expenses of notice and
administration and of an incentive award to the Class Representative from the Fee and Expense
Award (or, to the extent paid before entry of this Order, from the Fee and Expense Fund), as
provided in the Settlement Agreement and this Court's Orders, the amount remaining in the Fee
and Expense Award shall be the amount awarded as attorneys' fees in this action.

I.

UNDER GEORGIA LAW, A PERCENTAGE OF THE COMMON FUND
GENERATED IN CLASS ACTION CASES IS GENERALLY AWARDED AS
ATTORNEYS' FEES.
Under Georgia law, where a common fund is generated in litigation for the benefit of

persons other than the named plaintiff, reasonable attorneys' fees are paid from the fund:
"[ A] person who at his own expense and for the benefit of persons in addition
to himself, maintains a successful action for the preservation, protection or
creation of a common fund in which others may share with him is entitled to
reasonable attorney fees from the fund as a whole."
Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 256, 260 (2006) (quoting State v. Private Truck Council of
America, Inc., 258 Ga. 531, 534-35 (1988). This principle is an exception to the ordinary rule
that each litigant bears his own attorneys' fees. It is grounded in substantial part on "'the
perception that persons who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without contributing to its cost are
unjustly enriched at the successful litigant's expense.'" Barnes, 281 Ga. at 260.
The Georgia courts have also held that the fees to be paid from the common fund should
be based on a percentage of the fund. In adopting this rule, the Court of Appeals canvassed
federal authorities and selected the common fund approach. "We ... hold that when assessing
attorney fees in a common fund case, a percentage of the fund analysis is the preferred method of
determining these fees .... " Friedrich v. Fidelity Nat' 1 Bank, 247 Ga. App. 704, 707, (2001).
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The Court of Appeals imposed the following requirements on this Court's decision-making
process:
[W]e also conclude that when awarding attorney fees in this type of case,
a trial court must "articulate specific reasons for selecting the percentage
upon which the ... award is based." [Camden I Condominium Ass'n, Inc.
v. Dunkle, 946 F.2d 768 (lith Cir. 1991)] at 775. The trial court's order must
identify all factors on which the court relied and explain how each factor
affected the selection ofthe percentage awarded as attorney fees. Id. at 775.
While these factors may vary from case to case, Camden I identifies several that
should be considered:
[T]he Johnson factors continue to be appropriately used in
evaluating, setting, and reviewing percentage fee awards in
common fund cases. Other pertinent factors are the time required
to reach a settlement, whether there are any substantial objections
by class members or other parties to the settlement terms or the
fees requested by counsel, any non-monetary benefits conferred
upon the class by the settlement, and the economics involved in
prosecuting a class action. In most instances, there will also be
additional factors unique to a particular case which will be relevant
to the [trial] court's consideration.
Friedrich, 247 Ga. App. at 707-708 (quoting Camden I, 946 F.2d at 775). The "Johnson
factors" are standards enumerated by the u.s. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), for use by
courts in analyzing and setting a statutory award of fees. That Court's analysis ofthe
basis for awards of attorneys' fees is well accepted by all federal and most state courts.
The Johnson factors include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and
difficulty ofthe questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4)
the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5)
the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
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obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability ofthe attorneys; (10) the ''undesirability'' of
the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12)
awards in similar cases. 488 F.2d at 717-19.
In Camden I, relied upon by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Friedrich, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit identified the result obtained by class counsel as the preeminent consideration: "In this context, monetary results achieved predominate over all other
criteria." 946 F. 2d at 774. The court also noted that a majority of common fund fee awards fall
between twenty and thirty percent (20% to 30%) of the fund, with an upper limit of fifty percent
(50%) as a general rule. The court recognized twenty five percent (25%) as a "'bench mark'
percentage fee award which may be adjusted in accordance with the individual circumstances of
each case." Id. at 775. Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized a district court's use
ofa thirty percent (30%) bench mark. Waters v. International Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d
1291,1294 (1Ith Cir. 1999) (thirty percent bench mark used by the district court and adjusted
upward to a final award ofthirty three and one-third percent in part because the case advanced
public policy concerns).
The Court observes that this case is one of several cases brought by Class Counsel
against Georgia state retirement systems that failed to follow the applicable statutes when they
calculated payments owed to retirees who chose a retirement benefit that would provide for
beneficiaries who survive the retirees. The three systems at issue are the Teachers Retirement
System of Georgia ("TRS"), the Employees Retirement System of Georgia ("ERS"), and the
Public School Employees System of Georgia ("PSERS"). As ultimately determined by the
Supreme Court of Georgia, the Georgia statutes required that these retirement systems use the
same mortality tables as a basis for all of their calculations, rather than using a new table for
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some purposes while relying on an old table when they calculated benefits for retirees and their
beneficiaries. This mistaken use of mortality tables resulted in an improper reduction in
retirement benefits for thousands ofretirees and their beneficiaries.
The services performed by Class Counsel on the merits in the first of these cases, Plymel
v. Teachers Retirement System of Georgia, Civil Action No. 2004-CV-843l2 in this Court,
resulted in decisions in this Court, in the Supreme Court of Georgia, and in the Court of Appeals of
Georgia that substantially advanced and resolved the merits in the other two cases, Willis v.
Employees Retirement System of Georgig, Civil Action No. 2007-CV-l28923, and Anderson v.
Public School Employees System ofGeorgig, Civil Action NO. 2008-CV-l54757. The Defendants
have recognized the binding effect of the Supreme Court's rulings in Plymel in applying the statutes
that govern benefits due to Class Members in all three ofthe cases. In addition to the interrelationship between the merits of the cases, the settlement of the Anderson case was directly
connected to the settlement ofthe Willis case. The connections between the cases, the benefits
derived for the Class in Willis from the services 0 f Class Counsel in Plymel, and the benefits
derived for the Class in Anderson from the services of Class Counsel in both Plymel and Willis are
clear and unmistakeable. The Court has previously entered an award in Plymel of30% of the
common fund, and the Court of Appeals of Georgia has affirmed that decision. Teachers
Retirement System of Georgia v. Plymel, 296 Ga. App. 839, 846-47 (2009).

II.

A PERCENTAGE OF 25% OF THE COMMON FUND IS THE PROPER
PERCENTAGE FOR AN AWARD TO COVER FEES, EXPENSES, AND
OTHER DISBURSEMENTS IN THIS CASE.
The benchmark for an award of attorneys' fees is between twenty and thirty percent (20-

30%) of the common fund, and, consistent with the case law, this Court views twenty-five
percent (25%) as an appropriate starting point in this case. Upon consideration of the relevant
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factors, the Court concludes that the benchmark would appropriately be adjusted upward because
ofthe extraordinary result and reward to the Class, the risk and responsibility assumed by Class
Counsel over the course of the three inter-related cases, the benefits conferred on the Classes in
the second and third cases by the services earlier performed by Class Counsel, and the significant
obstacles facing the Classes. In this instance, however, in light of Class Counsel's agreement to
request an award of no more than 25%, the Court will not make the upward adjustment from the
benchmark.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court makes the following analysis as required by
Friedrich. The Court's analysis tracks in substantial part its previous analysis in the Plymel case
in light of the connection between the cases:

1.

The Johnson Factors 2 Support an Upward Adjustment.
a.

Difficulty and Novelty of Issues in This Case Increased the Time,
Skill, Dedication, and Compensation Risks in Bringing This Action.

Plymel was filed in April, 2004, and took nearly four (4) years to reach the stage of a
fmaljudgment. Final judgment was followed by an additional one (1) year to conclude the
second appeal in that case. In litigating the questions in Plymel that led to resolution ofthis case,
Class Counsel addressed novel and difficult issues which required a significant amount of time,
labor, and resources to identify, understand, and effectively argue. O.C.G.A. §§ 47-2-1, §§ 47-31, et seq., and §§ 47-4-1, et seq.
Not only did Class Counsel have to sue the agencies charged3 with interpreting and

In Class Counsel's petition for attorneys' fees award, they did not address the fifth (customary
fees) except to the extent of their discussion of contingent fees or the eleventh (nature and length
of professional relationship with client) Johnson factors. In light ofthe abundance of evidence
justifying an upward award adjustment, the Court will base its analysis on the remaining ten
factors addressed.
2
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administering the plan, but they had to argue difficult and novel questions oflaw. TRS and ERS,
4

as the administrators, held the information and had unparalleled familiarity with the systems and
their governing statutes, but had been misinterpreting the statute for twenty (20) years, in the
case ofTRS, and fifteen (15) years, in the case ofERS. When faced with this litigation, TRS
and ERS vigorously defended their position, including arguing that the State's interpretation of
the statute was entitled to special consideration because of familiarity with the statutes and the
plan. TRS even rejected a proposed settlement after the Supreme Court held that their
calculations were not actuarially equivalent, and thus, that it was liable to the Plaintiff Class in
Plymel. ERS at that time was not even in a position to discuss the amounts owed to the Plaintiff
Classes because 0 f the status 0 fits re-calculations.
Because of the extremely complex nature of the case, Class Counsel first had to master
the underlying statutory scheme of the TRS retirement plan, O.C.G.A. §§ 47-3-1, et seq., and its
underlying subject matter - actuarial science. In order to do so, Class Counsel employed
considerable legal skill in first mastering a working knowledge of the plan and its calculations
and then examining experts in these fields. In this process, Class Counsel hired six (6) actuaries
to assist them in understanding the complicated calculations underlying the payments in
question.
Because of the difficulty and importance ofthe cases, Class Counsel devoted substantial
amounts of their time and percentage of their practices to Plymel and subsequently to Willis and
Anderson, to the exclusion of other cases. Necessarily, Class Counsel's involvement in the cases

Because of the need to sue an agency of the State of Georgia, many may perceive the cases to
be undesirable, thus satisfYing the tenth Johnson factor.
3

ERS administers both the Employees Retirement System and the Public School Employees
Retirement System.
4
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significantly precluded their work on other matters.
It is important to note Class Counsel's willingness to make the cases such a priority given

their contingent-fee based representation and risk of zero recoupment. For example, Plymel was
dismissed on an earlier motion for summary judgment, which would have foreclosed the
opportunity for Class Counsel to recoup expenses (at that time, approximately $200,000.00) and
fees associated with this action had the Georgia Supreme Court not found TRS liable, reversed
the earlier judgment, and remanded that case on the remaining issues. In addition, the appeal
that followed this Court's entry of final judgment in Plymel placed at risk any recovery at all for
many Class Members in all three ofthe cases because of the statute oflimitations questions at
Issue.

b.

The Time Considerations for the Affected Class Members Justify
an Upward Adjustment of the Common Fund Award.

Time is running out for many Class Members. The nature of the cases - seeking redress
for elderly retirement beneficiaries - starkly demonstrates time limitations related to any
meaningful recovery for Class Members. This is truly a case in which justice delayed is justice
denied for many members ofthe Classes. Moreover, retireees live on the modest fixed incomes
that their membership in the retirement systems provides. The extra dollars that they would have
received had TRS, ERS, and PSERS correctly calculated their benefits would have made a
substantial difference in the quality of their lives over the years of their retirement.

c.

The Result Obtained and the Amount of Recovery for the
Classes Are Exemplary.

In accordance with the Georgia Supreme Court's decision, TRS, ERS, and PSERS failed
to use the correct mortality tables and incorrectly calculated "option" member benefits. Before
2003, TRS had not updated its mortality tables for calculating the "option" benefits at issue in
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P1yme1 since 1983; thus, the P1yme1 Class consists of over 15,000 members. Before 2007, ERS
had not updated its mortality tables for calculating the "option" benefits at issue in Willis and
Anderson since 1992; thus the Willis Class consists of over 16,000 members, and the Anderson
Class consists of over 1,200 members.
The sum of back benefits, with interest, and future benefits reduced to present value, for
each Class Member, constitutes the common fund in this case. Because the Classes are numerous
and the breaches spanned a twenty (20) year period in P1yrne1 and a fifteen (15) year period in
Willis and Anderson, and the Classes are recapturing one hundred percent (100%) of the
principal of the benefits owed,s the common fund in Willis has been estimated to be
approximately $135 million, and the common fund in Anderson has been estimated to be
approximately $1.4 million. As Camden I recognizes, the "'commonfund is itself the measure
of success . .. [and] represents the benchmark on which a reasonable fee will be awarded. '"
Camden I, supra, 946 F.2d. at 774 (quoting Newburg, Attorney Fee Awards § 2.07 at 47 (1986)).
Most important, however, is not the final dollar amount, but that the Class awards in
Willis and Anderson represent a near-total recovery under the law as now determined in the
course oftwo appeals in PlymeL The Class recovery is not a settlement ofa compromised and
negotiated portion of the benefits sought, with a compromise on interest rate only. In
accordance with the Friedrich standard, the award of attorneys' fees should be commensurate
with this significant result.

5 As part ofthe settlement of Willis and Anderson, the parties agreed to apply interest rates to
the amounts owed on the legal theory adopted by this Court in its [mal judgment in Plymel but
later reversed by the Court of Appeals. This agreement in the context of settlement does not
lessen the 100% recovery of principal to Class Members within the period of the statute of
limitations on which the Court of Appeals ruled in P1ymel.
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The Court also deems it important to note that, while Anderson, in absolute dollars, is a
substantially lesser number than the dollars in Plymel and Willis, this results from the smaller
Class size and the smaller retirements paid under the Public School Employees statute. 6 In
addition, it appears to the Court that an allocation to the Fee and Expense Award of25% will
mean that, after payment of expenses already incurred and an incentive award to the Class
Representative, little if anything will remain of the Fee and Expense Award from the payments
made by PSERS to date (which the Court understands cover roughly half of the Class).
d.

The Combined Experience, Reputation, and Ability of Class Counsel
Are Significant.

The combined experience oflead Class Counsel, Mr. Cook, Mr. Gregory, and Mr.
Forehand, is one-hundred and twelve (112) years of practicing the law in Georgia.
Mr. Cook is a well-known litigator who has practiced law for over five (5) decades and
who was recognized as one of Georgia's Super Lawyers in 2006 and 2008. Mr. Gregory, a
member of the bar since 1966, has been a litigator, a Superior Court Judge, and a Georgia
Supreme Court Justice. Mr. Gregory also authored the treatise, Georgia Civil Practice
(LexisNexis/Mathew Bender), now in its third edition. Mr. Forehand has twenty (20) years
litigation experience, including previous work against Georgia's retirement systems and work on
other complex cases. Mr. Forehand also co-authored a chapter in Kaplan's Nadler, Georgia
Corporations, Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies (Thompson/West).

In addition, Mr. Richard H. Sinkfield has been a member of the State Bar of Georgia
since 1971, and is well-known as a skilled trial lawyer in this state. Mr. Sinkfield was also
recognized as a 2006 and 2008 Georgia Super Lawyer, and he is a Fellow of the American
6
Retirement benefits under the Public School Employees system are not calculated on the basis
ofannuitized employee contributions. Instead, Oc.G.A. § 47-4-101(b) provides a maximum
benefit of $15 per month times the number of creditable years of service.
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College of Trial Lawyers.
Each of these attorneys has substantial experience, a good reputation, and the ability to
address the issues presented in this case. The efforts of each have been necessary to bring the
case successfully to this point on behalf of the Class.

e.

An Award of30% is Consistent with Similar Cases.

The Johnson factors include consideration of awards in similar cases. The following is a
sampling of cases that illustrate the range of recovery granted to counsel in common fund cases

in Georgia.
1.

Plymel v. Teachers Retirement System of Georgia, Civil Action No. 2004-CV84312 (Fulton County Superior Court), has been previously discussed in this Order
and is also substantially described in the record before the Court on the
application of Class Counsel for an award in Willis and Anderson. This Court
awarded 30% of the common fund in that case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
that award.

2.

Barnes v. City of Atlanta, Civil Action No. 2000CV24809 (Fulton County
Superior Court). Barnes was a hard-fought case in which attorneys practicing law
in the City of Atlanta contested the City's right to collect occupation taxes. This
Court awarded thirty three and one-third percent (33% %) of the common fund of
$18.3 million to compensate counsel for the class. City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276
Ga. 449 (2003); Barnes v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 256 (2006).

3.

Mabry v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Civil Action No. U99CV4915
(Musco gee County Superior Court). Mabry was a case on behalf of State Farm
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policyholders with property damage claims. The primary question was whether
policyholders should have been paid for the diminished value oftheir vehicles
when they submitted claims. The case settled after the Georgia Supreme Court
ruled on the merits, State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 274 Ga. 498
(2001), with a settlement fund of$100 million and $100 million attributed to
"going forward relief' to Georgia policyholders. Counsel's fee award of$50
million represented twenty percent (20%) ofthe combined recovery and thirty
three and one-third (33 1/3) percent of the money paid by State Farm to settle.
(The going-forward relief was an estimated amount, paid to policyholders who
may not have been class members.)

4.

Friedrich v. Fidelity National Bank, Civil Action No. 98-CV01383 (Fulton
County Superior Court). Friedrich was a class action arising out of a failed
securities offering. The case was settled for $500,000.00 after about three (3)
years oflitigation. After an appeal on the question of attorneys' fees, Friedrich v.
Fidelity Nat. Bank, 247 Ga. App. 704 (2001), this Court awarded twenty five
percent (25%) ofthe common fund to class counsel.

5.

In re Tri-State Crematory Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1467 (Northern District of
Georgia (2004)). Tri-State arose from the infamous operation of a crematory in
northwest Georgia. The case was brought on behalf ofrelatives ofthe persons
whose remains had been mishandled by the crematory. The case was settled, with
the settlement fund estimated to reach approximately $80 million. Judge Murphy
awarded attorneys' fees for class counsel in the amount of thirty three percent
(33%) of all amounts collected.
12

6.

Flournoy v. Honeywelllnt'l. Civil Action No. CV-205-184 (Southern District of
Georgia (2007)). Flournoy was a suit by coastal property owners for injury
caused by chemical contamination of the Turtle River Estuary. The case settled
for $25.3 million, and Judge Alaimo awarded counsel the bench mark twenty five
percent (25%) ofthe fund.

Friedrich and Flournoy each were awarded twenty five percent (25%) of the common
fund. Barnes and Tri-State were awarded thirty three percent (33%), and Mabry was something
of a hybrid, with the award characterizable as thirty three percent (33%) or as twenty (20%) and
with the real value closer to the former than the later. The instant three cases against retirement
systems, like Barnes, Mabry, and Friedrich, were substantially affected by appeals. Also, these
cases, like Barnes, achieved a high class return, whereas the other cases highlighted in this
section were resolved through settlements that may have substantially reduced recovery. Finally,
this case, like Barnes, brought about a result that but for class representation would not likely
have happened: TRS refused requests from retired teachers to voluntarily recalculate the option
benefits, and ERS refused to take any corrective action until after the Supreme Court ruled in
Plymel. The individual Class Members most likely would have been unable to obtain or pay for
individual representation. Thus, these cases, like the Barnes case, warrant an upward adjustment
of the common fund percentage because of the degree of difficulty, the overall monetary award,
and the results for the Class Members.

2.

Freidrich Additional Factors Also Support an Upward Adjustment.

The Freidrich additional factors take into consideration the time to resolution, objections
by class members, non-monetary benefits, the economics ofthe lawsuit, and any factors unique
to the case. Considering that the Plymel case was appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court
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of Appeals, that the TRS trustees rejected a settlement which their counsel recommended that
they accept, and that ERS was even slower in meeting its obligations, the five (5) year journey to
resolution of the cases was replete with obstacles. Few Class Members opted out of the Classes.
Third, the resolution of these cases will bring significant non-monetary benefits in that it requires
statutory compliance by TRS, ERS, and PSERS and the correct future calculations of all benefits
owed to Class Members. In addition, the dollar amount owed to each Class Member, by itself,
could not have justified or supported the legal challenge necessary to succeed on the merits of
this case.
Finally, a unique factor not to be overlooked in this lawsuit is that the Class Members are
public employees who served this State and its citizens. These employees invested a portion of
their modest salaries into the retirement funds and now are merely seeking a full return of their
investment to which they are entitled. This money, while a significant amount in sum total, is, in
reality, going to be a payment of dollars to each Class Member. That money will be significant
in its impact on the retired, fixed-income recipients. The Class Members spent their lives
serving Georgia, and it is past time for them to receive the retirement benefits they are due under
the law of this State.
III. CONCLUSION.

The factors that the Court has reviewed and considered demonstrate that, based on the
results obtained, the substantial legal questions and risk involved, and the work performed on
behalf ofthe Classes, the benchmark would be properly adjusted upward in this case. In light of
the terms of the settlements in Willis and Anderson, however, the Court GRANTS an award of
twenty-five percent (25%) ofthe common fund as the Fee and Expense Award. The Court
directs that amounts previously allocated under the parties' Settlement Agreement to the Fee and
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Expense Fund and not yet expended for the costs of notice and administration shall be added to
the Fee and Expense Award to the extent of this Court's percentage award, consistent with the
provisions of Section III of the Settlement Agreement. After payments of remaining expenses
ofnotice and administration and of an incentive award to the Class Representative from the Fee
and Expense Award as provided in the Settlement Agreement and this Court's Orders, the
amount remaining in the Fee and Expense Award shall be the amount awarded as attorneys' fees
in this action.

SO ORDERED, this 8th day of July, 2009.

ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE
SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
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